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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2 (a)-3(2) (d) and (f) (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. Did the Prosecution show beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the Defendant was in fact guilty of the crime of retail 
theft? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review is that, if 
the Trial Court's Findings of Fact are erroneous or clearly 
erroneous, said Findings of Fact should be set aside. 
U.R.C.P. 52(a); State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
a. The City of Orem alleges that the Defendant 
committed the crime of retail theft by hiding some lip gloss 
in her cart, and then leaving the store without making any 
attempt to pay for the merchandise. 
b. At trial, the prosecution's witnesses 
testified that the Defendant entered Albertson's, located at 
1585 N. State Street, Orem, Utah. Upon entering the store, 
Defendant asked about exchanging some make-up, which the 
clerk determined their store did not carry. Defendant 
continued shopping for other items, and while shopping, she 
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placed some Bonnie Bell lip light in her purse in the cart. 
The clerk testified that he mentioned to Defendant that 
Allen's down the street may carry the Defendant's particular 
brand of make-up. Defendant testified that she told the 
clerk up front that she could not remember if she bought the 
make-up at Macey's or Allen's. 
c. Defendant paid for several other items, but 
failed to pay for the lip lights which the clerk had 
observed her put in her purse. 
d. Defendant then left the store and was stopped 
outside. The lip lights were recovered from her purse. 
e. Defendant and the clerk both testified 
that she had picked up several items at the store and placed 
them in the basket. 
f. Defendant had, in the process of approaching 
the check stand, picked up her day planner and began to 
unzip it, and while opening it, put the makeup which she had 
in her hand down. 
g. Defendant further testified that she had 
bought several items, and did not notice the lip gloss which 
had fallen into her purse, and simply forgot she had picked 
up the lip gloss and needed to pay for it. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There was insufficient evidence to convict Defendant of 
the crime of retail theft. When asked about the indicia of 
someone who is not intentionally taking an item from the 
store, the store security officer described what Defendant 
had been doing. Further, the jury was very clearly uncom-
fortable with their decision to find Defendant guilty-when 
the jury members filled the jury survey forms, each jury 
mentioned, and did not mention anything else, that they 
appreciated Judge Backlund's comments about how difficult it 
was to sit in judgment of someone else. Had the jurors felt 
comfortable with their decision, they should not have been 
uncomfortable; there was, after all, no reasonable doubt 
that the Defendant was guilty. The fact that each juror 
felt uncomfortable with the finding of guilty demonstrates 
that they misunderstood the standard of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, or misapplied the standard. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DID THE PROSECUTION SHOW BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE 
DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF RETAIL THEFT? 
It is well-established law in Utah that an appellate 
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court affords great deference to a jury verdict. The Utah 
State Supreme Court very clearly stated this principle in 
1991: "where there is any evidence, including reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from it, from which findings of 
all the elements of the crime can be made beyond a reason-
able doubt, our inquiry is complete and we will sustain the 
verdict. State vs. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). 
The jury in the present case found the Defendant guilty of 
the crime of retail theft. In order to do so, the evidence 
must be beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, however, 
there is definitely a question about whether the evidence 
supports the verdict. 
After receiving the jury's verdict, the Trial Court 
stated: 
I guess a comment might be appropriate. You've heard 
enough from me today but I think this has been a diff-
icult case for you and it's always difficult as now you 
know how I feel probably sitting here in judgment of 
people because that's what you've been doing today and 
it's not an easy task and so I think I can understand 
how you feel. . . I think you've done the very best job 
that you can given the facts that were presented to you 
and the law that you have to work with. Tr. 107. 
Very clearly, the Trial Court felt uncomfortable with 
the verdict reached by the jury. In addition, the Court 
continued just a few sentences later by saying the 
4 
following: 
And the jury has spoken and it's inappropriate for me 
to comment on the verdict. This is a jury trial and 
they've rendered the verdict so I'm not going to 
comment whether I think it's a proper or improper 
verdict. Tr. 108. 
It should also be noted that the Trial Court, on its 
own motion, decided to poll the jury, to determine if the 
ver-dict of guilty was really what each individual juror in-
tended. The cumulative effect of the Court's actions is to 
show that the Court obviously doubted the verdict, and 
questioned whether the jurors really intended to find the 
Defendant guilty. This very clearly raises the question of 
whether reasonable minds could and should have reached the 
decision reached by the jury. 
The evidentiary problems raised at trial, which raise 
the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the verdict, arise in the testimony of the prosecution's 
witnesses on direct examination. The second witness called 
by the prosecution was Joshua Quarnberg, an assistant 
manager at Albertson's. At one point in his examination, 
the Prosecutor asked Mr. Quarnberg "How do you decide 
whether or not you're going to actually stop somebody?" The 
witness responded with the following: 
Whether it appears to me whether they did it inten-
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tionally to, to hide the item so that it wouldn't be 
seen or whether they were looking for some place, you 
know, they just didn't have room, they need that item. 
. . . I do approach them if I do think that they didn't 
intend on doing it, if you know, they just didn't think 
about it, they thought, you know, their hands were 
full. Tr. 55, 56. 
Asked if he had actually stopped individuals who had con-
cealed items without having them arrested, Mr. Quarnberg 
"that would be in a case where their hands were full and 
they just needed somewhere else to stick an item, you know, 
so they stuck it in their pocket not intending to steal it 
but, you know." Tr. 56, 57. 
The undisputed testimony of the Defendant fits exactly 
the circumstances which Mr. Quarnberg says give an indi-
cation that the individual does not intend to steal the 
item. She entered the store with some of her own makeup, 
hoping to make an exchange for a different kind of makeup. 
Tr. 22, 41, 79. When informed that Albertson's did not 
stock that kind of makeup, the Defendant shopped for 10 to 
15 minutes, selected some more makeup and other items to 
purchase, and headed for the checkout. Defendant began 
fumbling with her dayplanner in order to get her money out 
so she could pay for the items she had selected. Tr. 81. 
While trying to unzip her day-planner, Defendant flipped the 
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lip gloss she had in her hand forward. It fell into her 
open bag, and the Defendant proceeded to the checkstand to 
pay for her groceries. At the checkstand, she did not put 
the lip gloss on the conveyor for purchase. Tr. 81-83. 
Defendant paid about $20 for the groceries did purchase, in 
cash, and testified that she had an additional $60 or so on 
her at the time. Tr. 84. It is just important to note what 
Mr. Quarnberg did not indicate had happened as to remember 
what he did say happened. He did not claim that the 
Defendant was looking around to see if anyone was watching 
for her. He did not say she was looking for cameras. She 
did not move furtively or nervously in any manner. What mr. 
Quarnberg did testify to is that the Defendant walked past a 
rack while she was fumbling with something in her hands. 
She made no overt attempt to conceal the items, but instead 
threw the items in front of her, into her open bag. The bag 
was still open at the checkout stand. This fits exactly 
with the actions that Mr. Quarnberg claims he uses to use as 
an indication that an individual does not intend to steal 
merchandise. Further, her hands were full—she had her 
dayplanner in her hands trying to unzip it so she could get 
her cash out to pay for the merchandise she had selected. 
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When stopped by Mr. Quarnberg after passing the checkout 
stand, she did not try to deny the fact that she had unpaid 
for merchandise, but immediately stated that she had 
forgotten to pay for it. 
The cumulative effect of the evidence presented is that 
there was a reasonable doubt as to Defendant's guilt. The 
Court very clearly felt uncomfortable with the evidence, 
and, as shown by the statements by the jurors in the survey 
forms they returned to the judge, the jurors obviously felt 
uncomfortable with their decision. The problem is that they 
did not recognize this discomfort as what it really was—a 
reasonable doubt about the evidence and their decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the Defendant believes that the 
verdict of the jury should be overturned. Very obviously, 
reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict the jury 
reached; even the jurors felt uncomfortable with their 
decision. In order to decide that Defendant was actually 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, a reasonable person had to 
decide that Mr. Quarnberg's testimony was only partially 
reliable. If his testimony was only partially reliable, the 
jury had to decide there was some reasonable explanation for 
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deciding to discount part of it. There is nothing in the 
record to support this decision. If Mr. Quarnberg's 
testimony is reliable, then based on his own statements, the 
Defendant met every criteria he used to determine whether to 
call the police on a person suspected of retail theft. 
Defendant firmly believes that the jury could not have 
reasonably found as they did, and that the verdict should be 
overturned. 
DATED this 24th day of September, 1999. 
Randy M. Lish 
Attorney for Defendant 
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